It is clear that the Modi government has changed the game in Kashmir internally and, as a consequence, externally also
ON the stump in Gujarat, prime minister Narendra Modi proudly declared that he has resolved the Kashmir issue. The PM added that he accomplished the feat by following in the footsteps of Sardar Patel, while taking an oblique dig at the first prime minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, blaming him for complicating Kashmir’s accession to India by taking the issue to the United Nations.
Pakistan in response “categorically rejected” the remarks made by the PM, calling on India to stop making “delusional statements about having resolved the dispute unilaterally,” and asking the Indian leadership to “deliver on their commitments to Kashmiris”.
The two statements differ in that Modi’s is supported by a profound change in the realities on the ground in Kashmir, whereas Pakistan’s sounds like boilerplate.
Over three years after the withdrawal of Article 370 which granted Kashmir a special constitutional position within the Indian Union, the region has changed beyond recognition. Once vaunted separatist conglomerate Hurriyat Conference has become extinct. Many of the grouping’s top leaders continue to be in jail or are under house arrest. This has hobbled its capacity to organize any political activity.
But even if the separatist leaders were free – and some of them are free – the situation would hardly be different. The government has outlawed any sign of separatist activity in whatever form and disproportionately raised the costs for any leader or an activist to go out and champion the cause.
There have also been far-reaching administrative and legal changes right from the domicile laws to new land laws. As a result, J&K citizenship and the buying of land have been thrown open to outsiders. The government has also overturned the Roshni Act whereby occupants of state land were allowed to own it against payment determined by the government. Scores of other laws have been extended to the former state that is aiding the process of fundamentally altering the facts on the ground.
At the same time, the government has changed the electoral map of J&K by creating District Development Councils, a third tier of the grassroots democracy, whose members unlike in any other state in India are being directly elected. The DDCs are expected to not only undermine the role of the gram sabhas and the Block Development Councils – the first and second tier of Panchayati Raj respectively – but also detract from the powers of the Assembly. The 14-member DDC headed by a chairperson is largely in charge of the district. Their decisions override those of a panch, sarpanch, and a BDC member. Similarly, a future Member of Assembly despite being a member of the DDC will have no role in the election or removal of its chairperson.
The only thing that remains constant from pre-August 5, 2019 when J&K’s special status was revoked, is the militancy. It has gone on regardless of the far-reaching changes that have overtaken Kashmir despite the killings of more than 500 militants over the last three years. And as long as the local recruitment continues as looks likely and the armed men continue to cross over from Pakistan, the militancy seems here to stay.
Going forward, the current situation is likely to linger on for a while. Though there is talk of an Assembly election being held later this year or early next year, nothing can be said with certainty. Until that time, the DDCs will serve as a replacement for the Assembly.
Similarly, the Centre is unlikely to restore the statehood of J&K. It seems to be subordinate to the circumstances thrown up by a future elected UT government. The centre, as seems clear, doesn’t want its decision to undo Article 370 to be in any way challenged by an Assembly dominated by the parties that have Kashmir as their core base.
The last three years have also shown that the world doesn’t care about the withdrawal of Article 370. Even the concern about human rights in the months following the repeal of autonomy has abated. Kashmir is now more or less off the international radar.
Similarly, while Pakistan may not have reconciled to the constitutional changes in Kashmir, it has now kind of gotten used to the new state of affairs in the region. Its protestations about India’s actions in Kashmir haven’t found adequate traction across the world. In fact, the US and Europe, which largely influence world opinion, have been barely responsive – their attention is now centered on the ongoing war in Ukraine.
What does the future hold for Kashmir? The probability is that it will be more of the same. Even if the BJP loses power in the future, the Article 370 move remains a fait accompli. And if a large number of outsiders acquire citizenship and buy the land, as the new legal regime has made possible, J&K will be a different place a few years down the line.
So, very little that we thought and understood about Kashmir before August 5, 2019, applies now. And if we continue to look at the situation through the same prism, there’s no way we can understand what is happening in Naya Kashmir. The new Kashmir needs rethinking our decades-old understandings and narratives to make sense of it.
It is clear that the Modi government has changed the game in Kashmir, internally and, as a consequence, externally also. So, if the PM says he has resolved Kashmir unilaterally and on his own terms, the existing ground reality in the former state bears him out.
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